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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT

Defendants-Respondents agree with Plaintiff-A
·
· · in the lo\"er PPel.
l an t ' s s t a t ement as to the disposition
' coun
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondents request that the decision of the low,
court be affirmed and they be awarded their cost of th~,
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondents admit the Appellant's contract with Cedar City Corporation and the Federal Aviation Agency
and its subcontract with M & S Construction and Engi·
neering Company and also that Respondents furnished
labor and materials to said project at the instance of ill
& S Construction. Respondents deny that they failed to
give notice to the Appellant within the time required
but affirmatively allege and represent that both Re·
spondents gave sufficient and adequate notice to the
Appellant pursuant to the law.
It is correct that the defendants Smith, performed
labor and services for M & S Construction from Auguq
1, 1963, to and including September 25, 1963. That there· I
after no formal notice was sent by Smith to anyone con· /
nected with the project except M & S Construct101
until on or about December 5, 1963, at which timt
the said Smith discussed the matter personally 111 111
Jack Whiting, one of the owners of Whiting Bro:
Construction. At that time Jack Whiting and Willi
ing Bros. Construction were aware that 1VI & S Con
struction was not going to complete its contract as 1:
· on at le"''' '
was removing its equipment from the Job.
·
h"
th
two occasions thereafter, and wit m
e nex t few da\'
. ·.1
the said Smith agai~ discussed th: bill with Jack i~ ~ '.;.
incr who assured Smith that all bills would be pa
o
Th t ther1
cause all principal parties were bonded.
a
1

1

1
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1

f1el' and on or about December 27, 1963, Smith received
a copy of the letter from one Lloyd D. George, Attorney
for Whiting Bros. Construction Company, reference to
whicl1 i::: made in more detail, hereafter.
With respect to the Respondent Hoyt, he also contracted with M & S Construction to furnish a welding
1iJa.rhine aiid certain supplies on a monthly basis commencing September 17, 1963, and ending December 17,
1%:}, at an agreed price of $150.00 per month. That on
or about December 5, 1963, the M & S Construction started pulling its equipment off the job as it was no longer
able to perform its agreed contract. That on December
5, 1963, Hoyt contacted James H. Mendenhall, Vice
President and Superintendent of M & S Construction
relative to his bill whereupon Mendenhall executed an
assignment in favor of Hoyt on funds owing from Whiting Bros. Construction. On that same date the assignment was delivered to Jack Whiting at Cedar City, Utah,
with a full explanation to Whiting of the purpose, nature,
and reason for the assignment. Hoyt was assured by Jack
Whiting that a check for the amount due ($565.00)
would be sent from Whiting's office in Las Vegas, Nevada on the bus to Cedar City the following day. On DeCPmber 6, 1963, Jack Whiting informed Hoyt and Smith,
that all amounts then due and owing to M & S Construction had been previously assigned to a bank in Clearfield,
Utah. Thereupon, Whiting assured both Smith and Hoyt
that Lherc were various bonds in existence to protect
everyone concerned with the project. Thereafter, and
on other occasions, both Hoyt and Smith were assured
by Jack Whitning that everything was being done to
protect the various creditors.
On or about December 27, 1963, Hoyt also received
a mimeographed copy of the letter sent by one Lloyd D.
George, Attorney for Whiting Bros. Construction, relati\C: to the situation with M and S Construction and the
PetYH1~llt of the various creditors.
It is the co~1tention of the Respondents, although ad-
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mitting that no formal demand was made upon the
Appellant by registered mail as set forth in the statute
that the meaning and purpose of the law was complied
with and it would be inequitable and unjust to permit
the Appellants to escape liability on a technicality of
law not contemplated by the law itself.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RE.SPONDENTS .SMITH AND HOYT GAVE ADEQUATE AND SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO APPELLANT WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENT OF
THE STATUTE.
The appellant has set forth the Statute in its brief in
detail at page 5 thereof and the same is incorporated
herein by reference. The important part thereof and the
portion \vith which we are concerned, in substance states,
that for a materialman or a subcontractor to have a
cause of action over and against the prime contractor,
he must give written notice within ninety days after
the last work performed or material furnished to the
prime contractor, stating with substantial accuracy the
amount claimed and the name of the party to whom the
material was furnished or supplied or for whom the
labor was done or performed.
It should first be noted, and the case so hold, that
the statute involved is remedial and under the authorities should be liberally construed. United States for the
Use of Hallenbeck v. Fleisher Engineering and Construction Co., 2 Cir., 107 F2d 295, affimed 311 U. S. 15, S. ct.
81, 85 L. Ed. 12. Also, that the provisions of the statute
have been held to be directory rather than mandatory.
The appellant raises the additional requirement that
t:ic notice or claim must demand that the prime contractor pay the debt but there is nothing in the statute
of this nature.
The notice provision of the Miller Act has been given
a liberal construction in many cases, the courts holding
that the main purpose of the provision is to insure that
tlw gP11cral contractor has knowledge of the claim and
the circumstances surrounding it, and that if it can be
<iown that the general contracto;: has such knowledge,
lb.e notice may be regarded as sufficient despite the fact
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that the formalities of the notice prnvision may not ho .
been met.
ult
Very briefly and in view of the fmeaoing
le·t's. 1ou·k
0
,
at the facts. On December 5, 1963, Whiting Bros. knei"
that M & S ~onstruction could not and did not intend
to complete its subcontract. It was also aware that ii
general assignment of all funds owing to M & s Coiistruction had been made to a third party not connected
with the project either as a supplier or laborer. Both
Smith and Hoyt discussed their accounts, both as to
amount and nature, with Jack Whiting on or about that
same date and on various other occasions thereafter
and further they each received a letter from Whitino
Bros. Construction directed to and acknowledging that
they and each of them, were creditors of M & S Con·
struction on that same project.

1

b

POINT II
THE LETTER OF APPELLANT'S COUNSEL SENT
TO RESPONDENTS SMITH AND HOYT WAS AN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THEIR CLAIM AND AP·
PELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING LACK
OF NOTICE.
The letter in question (R 19-21) was dated Decembc1
26 1063 and was received by both Smith and Hoyt with·
in ' a day' or two thereafter. The letter is directed to cred·
itors of M & S Construction and sent to each of the Re·
spondents herein which would clearly indicate knowlegc
on the part of Whiting Bros. Construction that these
individuals had a claim. The letter acknowledges mone.i
in the hands of Whiting Bros. Construction which be·
longed to M & S Construction and its creditors and on
page 2 of said letter the method by which creditors m~
expect payment is also outlined. Also, in the last paic1
graph on page 2, the letter also persuade ere d1·tors thal
. '·
they are not being mislead or misdirected and the 011 ~'
· l tter 111
question is who is entitled to the funds. This
e

1

1
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1

1'(Jlljtmdin11
1·J;1i111 ;11 its !tc1

"·ith Jack ·whiting's assurance that the

d

no

t't'ason lo be concerned for their money

in vievv of the tact that all parties were bonded con-

'
stitutes notice, reasonable reliance by the claimants
which would in turn estop the Appellant from now claiming lack of proper notice. In support of this contention
Respondents cite the case of United States use of Hopper Bros. Quarries vs. Peerless Casualty Co. 255 F2d 137,
cert den 358 U S 831, 3 L ed 2nd 69, 79 S ct. 51, and
further cited in 78 ALR 2d at page 430. In that case the
claimant had sent a letter to the general contractor within the 90 day period seeking information with respect
to its bill and the general contractor had referred the
claimant to the subcontractors' bonding company. The
court concluded that the general contractor had misled
the claimant and lured him into not perfecting a notice
by referring to the subcontractor's bonding company
as a possible source for the claimant to recover payment, when, in fact, only the general contractor could
s.ue on this bond, and the general contractor knew that
it alone was liable to the claimant if he was unable to
recover from the subcontractor. The court continued:
"The inevitable effect of the answer so volunteered by
the contractor was to prevent plaintiff from taking advice or adding anything to the written notice of the
claim which it had given to the contractor in its
letter. Plaintiff had reason to believe that the contractor
found the written notice sufficient and it would be unconscionable to permit the contractor and the bondsman to escape their just obligation to pay because of
any deficiency in what was, under the circumstances, a
matter of form, and that deficiency in form was attributable to their own conduct. There can be no claim
that any substantial right of any of the parties was in
and degree affected by the omission from the written
notice of the dollars and cents due and the defendants
in this action are plainly estopped to defeat recovery
on that ground. To hold otherwise would be to exalt
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form over substance and frustrate the purpose for whil':,
the Act was passed."
·
The cases all seem to agree that the purpose of the
statute is for the protection of materialmen and laborers and that the general contractor and his surety
should not be permitted to avoid its obligations ansin~
from contracts within the meaning and scope of th;
statute upon technicalities not contemplated by the Jaii.
The purpose of the statute was intended for two mai:'
purposes, namely, that the general contractor be placed
on notice of a claim against a subcontractor and the
amount thereof and then, secondly, to permit the gen
eral contractor to withhold any further funds due thP
subcontractor until the claims are settled. In the instant
case, on the date that prime contractor was first contacted by the two Respondents, the suucontractor, Ml(
:::> Construction, was imlling oft the jou and did no1 u1· 1
tend to complete the contract, which the Appellant weu
knew. The Appellant was i11 possession ot all mone,1
then due M & S Construct10n .l:ur the work done to dale,
as evidenced by the subsequent letter in question herern
(R 19-20-21.), and thereafter, the Appellant obtained ail
other monies aue on the subcu{ltract as it, the Appeila1
completed the remainder oi the subcontract. The gener"'
contractor (Appellant) was then in a position to adt·
quately protect itself and did so, to the injury of \Le
l\,espondents and other claimants.
Two further cases are cited in support ot Respondeni'
view, although there are many others to the same elicLi,
but none tound by the hespondents so closely on "''
tour with the instant case. ln the case of Houston f 11'
and Casualty Insurance Company vs. United States 0 i
America for the Use and Benefit of the Trane Cornpaii.'·
'.::!17 F 2d 727 annotated in rl8 ALR 2d 435, wherein tlii
representativ~ of the materialman had talked with''
representative of the prime contractor with fefere!l'-'
to the bill and the amount owing and the prime suG
111
contractor had subsequently and in writing al'.kn°
1 .,
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cdgccl the conversation, there being no express or ex-

p!ici1 writing from the materialman to the prime contrn1co1, and the court therein held "It is not necessary
that tlte writing relied on be signed by the supplier, it
io: :o.ufficient that there exists a writing from which, in
connection with oral testimony, it plainly appears that
the nature and state of the indebtedness was brought
home to the general contractor. When this appears the
object of the statute, to assure that the contractor will
have notice, is attained and the statute is sufficiently
complied with."
In Coffee vs. United States (1946, CA5 Fla.) 157 F2d
'.!lii'l, annotated in 78 ALR 2d 433,, the plaintiff therein
!1,1d visited one of the partners comprising the prime
(ontrador and had advised him of the balance due from
a ~;ubcontractor, and at the same time handing the partner a statement in writing of the sums claimed to be
cL1e for the work although there was no showing that
the p:=irlner (prime contractor) in fact accepted actual
delivery and possession of the statement the court therin held "In the case now before us we hold that a writing containing the information which the stature requires, exhibited to the contractor by the claimant as a
notice of his claim and which the contractor examines
and discusses it and might have taken if he desired, as
a written notice sufficiently served."
With respect to the third point raised by the Appellant it its brief, namely, that the defendants Smith and
Hoyt had no express or implied contract with the plaintiff, surfice it to say that the defendants therein and the
RPsponclcnts herein do not contend any contractural
obligation between themselves and the Appellant herein
! Prime con tractor) except insofar as a contractural
obligation is created by the Miller Act itself, the statute
"rith which we are concerned.
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CONCLUSION
Defendants submit to this court, as their conclusion,
that based on the authorities herein cited and upon the
law as it is written and taking into consideration the
nature and purpose of the law and the fact situation
as herein set forth, that the lower court properly eoncluded that the defendants Smith and Hoyt were entit·
led to a judgment against the plaintiff therein and that
the action of the lower court should be affirmed with
costs given to these defendants.
Respectfully Submitted,
ROBERT L. GARDNER
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